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1. Introduction 
“Too many theories, too few facts.” This title, chosen by Baker and 
Holmstrom (1995) to their overview of the analysis of labour markets internal to the 
firm, remains today particularly suited to describe the work so far undertaken on the 
topic of the current chapter: Do firms compress the wage distribution relative to the 
distribution of worker productivities? If so, what is the impact of such compression 
on worker and firm performance and on labour turnover? A profusion of theories 
has not been matched by empirical testing, constrained as the analysis has been for a 
long time by data limitations. “Unfortunately, an appropriate data base with both 
worker and firm characteristics does not yet exist. A more complete understanding 
of the relationship between […] productivity, and wage dispersion may have to 
await better sources of data” (Levine, 1991: 251). In the meantime, a long way has 
been tracked in the production and analysis of linked employer-employee data. 
Early work on employer wages policies relied on extensive fieldwork on 
American companies. Interestingly, it called attention to the remarkable diversity in 
wage rates across firms, even when located in narrowly defined local labour 
markets, and the uniformity of wages inside the firm. Examples of this literature 
include Lester (1952), Dunlop (1957), Reynolds (1951) or, using econometric 
analysis on micro data on workers, Rees and Shultz (1970); an overview is provided 
by Kerr (1994). Ever since, the theoretical reasoning on why firms might have an 
incentive to compress the wage distribution relative to the distribution of worker 
productivities has been refined and some empirical testing using linked employer-
employee data (henceforth LEED) has been undertaken. 
This chapter starts with an overview of theoretical reasoning on the 
compression of wages by the firm. It aims, on one hand, at preparing the stage for 
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the review of the empirical literature that follows and, on the other hand, at helping 
define the setting for future empirical work, by getting into some detail on 
similarities and contrasts among the alternative theories. It then reviews empirical 
work that has used LEED to test theoretical predictions on the existence of a firm 
wage-compression effect and its implications on worker and firm productivity and 
labour turnover. 
The chapter focuses on intra-firm wage dispersion, leaving out issues such as 
decomposition of inequality into its within- and between-firm components, 
differences between high- and low-wage firms or overall inequality in the labour 
market, to the extent that they are not directly linked to the level of wage inequality 
within the firm. The terms dispersion and inequality will be used interchangeably. 
 
2. Theoretical framework on wage compression within the firm: a profusion of 
models 
A clarification of what is meant by compression of the wage distribution by 
the firm is in order. In a perfectly competitive labour market, workers’ pay would be 
attached to their productivity and a single wage would hold for workers of the same 
quality, no matter which firm they would work for; on the contrary, workers of 
different quality would receive different wages, even if working for the same firm. 
However, the distribution of wages paid by each firm does not necessarily mirror the 
distribution of workers’ productivities. To the extent that the distribution of workers’ 
productivities within the firm is more stretched than that of workers’ wages, we refer 
to the existence of a firm wage compression effect. 
The key factors explaining the existence of an employer wage compression 
effect range from workers’ preferences, to the production technology or the 
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information structure and frictions in the labour market, depending on the theoretical 
line considered. 
Efficiency wage models in general are set in a framework of market frictions, 
such as hiring, training, firing and moving costs. Wages above the market clearing 
level would operate as a device to stimulate effort and prevent workers from 
shirking, discourage quitting that is costly to the firm given the existence of hiring, 
training and firing costs, or attract the more able workers, when they are 
heterogeneous in their ability and the wage the worker is willing to accept signals 
his/her ability. A positive link between the wage and worker effort therefore follows. 
The fairness or morale version of efficiency wages further brings into the analysis 
the level of dispersion of wages within the firm or the equity of its wage distribution. 
The assumption in this case is that there is interdependence of preferences and that 
the behaviour of the worker, in particular his effort, will depend on the norms of the 
group where he belongs and will drop if the wage level is perceived to be unfair. 
That would arguably be the reason why firms would adopt a consistent pay standard 
across their labour force – that is what is considered fair, and thus induces effort, 
when the utility of the worker is shaped also by equity and fairness considerations. It 
therefore follows that more unequal firm wage distributions would threaten the 
morale or the cohesiveness of the group and reduce productivity. Hamermesh (1975) 
introduced for the first time interdependencies among workers when modelling 
labour demand and labour supply, as individual effort and productivity would 
depend, not just on the worker's own wage, but also on a comparison wage, for 
example the average wage in the firm. Solow (1979) referred to adverse selection, 
shirking and morale considerations as keys to establish a link between wages and 
worker productivity, which would contribute to explain the slow adjustment of 
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wages when the macroeconomic conditions change. Akerloff (1982) and Akerloff 
and Yellen (1990) are widely quoted as the initial formulation of the morale 
efficiency wage theory in the economics literature. Levine (1991) stressed the 
mechanisms linking wage compression to worker cohesiveness (workers sharing and 
behaving by group norms) and its impact on firm performance. Alexopoulos and 
Cohen (2004) contribute to the morale efficiency wage literature by discussing the 
choice of comparison groups and modelling the inclusion of workers below the 
worker’s own wage level in his/her comparison group, to conclude that firm’s output 
and profits will decline if wage compression from below is imposed, since the level 
of effort of the better paid workers will decline. Skott (2005) highlights that norms 
change endogenously, as past events shape what is considered a fair —in other 
words, a normal— wage, which therefore adjusts to fit actual outcomes1, leading in 
turn to a sluggish adjustment of wages to labour market shocks.2 
A different setting of interdependencies among preferences is assumed by 
Frank's (1984, 1985) theory on the quest for status —individuals care for their 
position in a hierarchy, comparing their own standing to the standing of others. 
Given distaste for being ranked low in a comparison group and given the assumption 
that individuals are free to choose the groups they join, in particular the firm they 
work for (the neighbourhood they live in, etc), they would presumably choose to 
associate with those who are similar to them and would sort into homogeneous 
groups. This is not the standard situation in the labour market, because some 
individuals are willing to pay for status and heterogeneity in willingness to pay 
                       
1 Though it may also suffer exogenous shocks. 
2 This model is more concerned with wage changes than with wage levels. 
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renders status within one's hierarchy a tradable good like any other. Heterogeneous 
associations will thus form, as status seekers transfer resources to those who care 
less about status. The relevant comparison group would be the firm, a local 
hierarchy of co-workers, and the wage of workers of equal productivity would vary 
depending on the rank position: those occupying a high rank in a firm would have 
given up part of their wage (relative to their marginal productivity) to pay for status, 
while those occupying a low rank in a firm would be compensated with a wage 
premium (relative to their marginal productivity). This compensating differential 
would prevent workers at the bottom from moving to join a new firm, where the 
productivities and wages of co-workers would be closer to their own.3 This trade-off 
between wage and status would be the key to explain the observed compression of 
the distribution of wages within firms, when compared to the distribution of worker 
productivities (Frank, 1984: 552). 
An apparent contrast with the tournament theory is worth noting. Whereas 
according to Frank rank position within one's hierarchy matters and workers are 
willing to pay for it, some versions of tournament theory establish, on the contrary, a 
convex relationship between pay and hierarchical level —as one moves up to the top 
of the firm hierarchy, pay differences increase. In Lazear and Rosen (1981), such 
convexity of the pay scale would work as an incentive mechanism to illicit 
investment in skills and effort from the workers. Rosen (1986) introduces the option 
to move further up as an additional benefit to those who are promoted (beyond the 
immediate monetary gain) and as such, at the top of the hierarchy, an extra wage 
                       
3 Frank assumes a competitive labour market and argues that on average it would 
still hold that workers in each firm would be paid their marginal productivity. 
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differential would be required to compensate for the lack of option to move further 
up. Nevertheless, Lazear (1989) considers the disruptive effects that tournaments 
may have on firm performance if workers can engage in counterproductive activities 
(such as sabotage of colleagues' work). In this case, he predicts some pay equality in 
profit-maximizing firms, to avoid disruptive behaviour by "hawks" in a system of 
pay for performance. One should however note that the type of pay equality Lazear 
refers to does not necessarily match that predicted by Frank. Frank's model 
considers the dispersion of the wage distribution relative to the dispersion of 
productivities, whereas in Lazear's model differences in productivity matter to the 
extent that the winner (the highest productivity worker) gets the pre-defined higher 
wage; as such, what matters in terms of productivity is just workers' ranking, and 
wage differences could be larger or smaller than realized productivity differences 
(see Lazear, 1984).  
A model with interdependence of preferences and labour market frictions 
was proposed by Cabrales et al (2008), extending the dynamic setting of contract 
theory where, in the presence of uncertainty, risk-neutral firms offer contracts to 
their risk-averse workers. The model assumes that workers are heterogeneous, but 
perfect substitutes, and moreover that their true ability is unobserved, being revealed 
after the start of an employment spell. A particular type of inequity-aversion is 
considered —workers dislike inequality when they are the low-wage earners, but 
have no concern when they are the high earners. Their reference group includes 
colleagues in the same firm with similar skill (more precisely, those with “a similar 
career history within the firm”). As such, the comparison group changes 
endogenously, as workers enter and leave the group, due to job turnover. Interesting 
predictions emerge, concerning the link between productivity and wages and worker 
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segregation across firms. First of all, frictions in the labour market tend to reduce 
worker segregation across firms. Indeed, in the presence of moving or hiring costs, 
flows of workers across firms will be lower and, once the productivity of a worker 
inside a firm is revealed to be high, his/her wage does not increase as much —labour 
market frictions shield the employer from the competitive or outside wage rate—, 
but nevertheless s/he may stay with the firm. Within the firm, low and high skill 
workers will therefore co-exist. Secondly, workers’ preference for equity will 
operate in the opposite direction, towards increasing segregation, simply because 
lower ability workers will suffer disutility from working with more skilled and 
higher paid colleagues and would prefer to join a firm with a more homogenous 
workforce. The relative importance of these two factors and the actual degree of 
segregation will depend on the extent of the moving costs. Thirdly, either factor 
operates to compress the wage distribution inside the firm relative to workers’ 
productivities: labour market frictions enable the firm to appropriate part of the 
productivity gains from higher skilled workers, even though it is subject to outside 
competitive pressure when setting its wages; lower skilled workers will require a 
compensation for the disutility of working with higher paid colleagues and will thus 
receive productivity-unrelated wage increases.4 Fourthly, the firm will use its 
personnel policy to manipulate the comparison group (for example, promoting some 
workers out of the comparison group and gradually increasing their salary, to reduce 
the costs of envy) and minimize the productivity-unrelated wage increases. The 
                       
4  Moreover, in this setting of contract theory, insurance provision may further 
increase wage compression inside the firm. 
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dynamic nature of the model is a major accomplishment with respect to previous 
models. 
Fehr and Schmidt (2001) and Sobel (2005) provide a very complete 
overview of models that assume the existence of interdependent preferences, 
distinguishing between stable preferences, when individuals care about the 
distribution of income or other payoffs at stake —they have “social preferences”, 
such as inequity aversion or altruism—, and context-specific preferences, when the 
individuals also care about the intentions behind the actions, the process or the 
environment —such as reciprocity models. Tests aimed at discriminating among 
these models have so far almost invariably relied on laboratory experiments and, 
less often, on field experiments. 
Away from interdependent preferences, the model by Kremer (1993) 
assumes that technological reasons could induce each employer to systematically 
choose employees with certain homogeneous characteristics. In this case, 
interdependence of workers’ skills is the crucial assumption. The skill of the worker 
is defined as the probability of successfully fulfilling his task and the basic idea is 
that the production process is made up of a series of complementary tasks, each of 
which can be performed perfectly or with errors. Only if all the tasks are completed 
perfectly will the product keep all its value and, in case of mistakes, the output will 
proportionately lose value —an analogy with the space shuttle Challenger is 
presented, where a small component among thousands of other ones, the O-rings, 
ruined the whole project. The output of a worker therefore depends, not just on his 
own skill, but as well on that of his co-workers. As such, the firm will have an 
incentive to combine workers of similar skill into the productive process: "firms 
with high q workers in the first (n-1) tasks place the highest value on having high-
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skill workers in the nth task, so they bid the most for these workers. Thus, in 
equilibrium, workers of the same skill are matched together in firms." (Kremer, 
1993: 554) Each firm is predicted to build a homogenous labour force, producing 
goods with corresponding quality, instead of hiring workers of different qualities 
and paying them the marginal product. The sorting of workers into firms according 
to their observed and unobserved ability would explain the wage differences among 
firms. Wages for different occupations would be correlated within firms due to the 
interactions among workers’ skill or “multiplicative quality effects”. Further 
developing the model generates the prediction that small differences in skill lead to 
sharp differences in wages and productivity across firms. Note however that in this 
case firms adopt a compressed wage distribution that reflects workers’ ability 
(observed and unobserved) and their productivity, augmented by the presence of 
skill externalities. 
Still other models allow for market imperfections as the key factor 
explaining the compression of wages but, different from models previously 
described, they make no assumption concerning interdependence of preferences. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) explicitly consider labour market frictions that 
compress the distribution of wages relative to the distribution of productivities: 
collective bargaining wage floors, national minimum wages, asymmetric 
information between current and prospective employer, or job search and other 
mobility costs. Under any of these mechanisms, the outside wage option of an 
employed worker is lower than his/her productivity. For example, the worker may 
have to incur a mobility cost, such that, even if s/he were paid his/her marginal 
product in the new firm, the net benefit from changing firms would be lower; the 
possibility of an intervening period of unemployment also lowers the net benefit 
 11
from job changing; prospective employers cannot fully observe the worker's skill 
and therefore the wage offer may not fully reflect it. Any of these frictions gives the 
current employer some monopsony power, i.e. the ability to pay the worker a wage 
below his/her marginal productivity, as it takes into account the worker outside 
option. Moreover, most of these frictions mean that the rents the firm extracts from 
skilled workers are larger than those it extracts from the unskilled —if the cost of 
unemployment is larger for the skilled, in particular when the unemployment benefit 
system is progressive; when higher skills are harder to observe by prospective 
employers; or when minimum wages are enforced. Having pinpointed the reasons 
leading to wage compression inside the firm, these authors core analysis is devoted 
to showing why firms may have an interest in investing in worker training —as a 
result of training, the worker's productivity will increase but, given the compression 
of the wage distribution, the firm does not have to fully pay the worker for the 
productivity improvement.5 
Manning (2003) provides a thorough discussion of monopsony models and 
several of its implications. In particular: the firm wage setting policy may detach 
wages from worker productivity, for example if the firm reacts to outside wage 
offers the worker may receive; worker turnover may be reduced if the firm matches 
outside wage offers, therefore resulting in lower turnover at the expense of higher 
                       
5 Booth and Zoega (2004) further highlight that the firm may have an 
incentive to provide training even in situations usually associated with competitive 
wages and no market distortions, like piece-rate payments, as long as the worker 
does not receive fully the benefits of the increase in productivity. 
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internal wage dispersion; firms may be willing to provide and pay for training, in a 
type of reasoning with similarities to Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).  
A few other bodies of theory were considered beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Insurance models per se, without any assumption on interdependent 
preferences, relate more directly to the reaction of wages to shocks and can explain 
why wages do not adjust as much as predicted by spot market theory. It is therefore 
more appropriate to analyze wage changes than wage levels. Incentives and delayed 
payment contracts, on the other hand, would lead one to expect the dispersion of 
wages to be larger than the dispersion of productivities, to the extent that young 
workers are paid below their marginal productivity and older workers are paid above 
their marginal productivity. Rent-sharing could explain wage differences across 
firms, as workers benefit from the good performance of their firm, but it does not 
provide an explanation why wage differentials inside the firm would be muted.6 
 
3. Do firms compress the wage distribution?  
The challenge involved in testing the type of theories just described has been 
eloquently synthesized by Raff and Summers, even though they were focusing on 
efficiency wage theories alone: “The very impediments to evaluating workers’ 
ability, motivation and stability that might lead employers to pay efficiency wages 
make conventional testing of efficiency wage theories difficult. If the information 
needed to test these theories were available, there might be no need to pay efficiency 
wages. Econometric tests of efficiency wage theories also face the problem that 
variations in wages across firms or workers are unlikely to be exogenous, 
                       
6 Rent-sharing is subject to detailed analysis in other chapters of this book. 
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complicating considerably the problem of identification." (Raff and Summers, 1987: 
S59) As such, tests on theories that assume interdependence of preferences have in 
the recent past often been conducted in laboratory experiments, which are not the 
scope of the current book. Instead, this chapter overviews empirical work using 
LEED that has aimed at testing theories that predict firm wage compression and, in 
some cases, attempted to disentangle explanations based on preferences, technology 
or market frictions.7 
Machin and Manning (2004) concentrated on a narrowly defined occupation 
in a narrow geographic labour market (care assistants in elderly residential homes in 
a region in the UK), arguing that in this market one should find competitive wages, 
given the large number of firms delivering a homogenous good and the lack of union 
influence or minimum wage enforcement.8 However, analysis of variance of wages 
indicates that wage dispersion across firms is large, while wage dispersion within 
the firm is small. That contrasts with the results on worker observable attributes 
(age, tenure, and hours worked), for which the within firm component of dispersion 
is very relevant. Corroborating evidence follows from the comparison of the 
determinants of wages and of the price of the product, taken as an indicator of 
performance, in two different samples: those firms that pay a flat wage to all of its 
workers, and those firms whose wage distribution has some degree of dispersion. 
Machin and Manning find that, while the determinants of the product price are 
similar across the two groups of firms, the determinants of wages are not, 
                       
7 Away from the focus of this chapter on LEED, several studies provide a lively 
overview of the role of fairness in wage determination, based on real life situations 
and interviews with firm leaders. 
8 At the time the analysis was undertaken, there was no minimum wage in the UK. 
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concluding that worker attributes that are related to productivity are not the ones 
shaping wage differentials and, moreover, that worker unobservable quality cannot 
account for the differences in wages. Overall, they interpret their results as evidence 
against the competitive wage setting model, possibly linked to the existence of 
labour market frictions that grant employers some freedom when setting wages, 
combined with workers’ preference for equity. 
A narrow set of workers and firms has also been considered in Bishop’s 
(1987) study. He relies on interviews with leaders of approximately 500 US firms, 
who provided information on two workers recently hired. The author runs 
regressions of the wage difference between these two workers on their productivity 
difference (as judged by supervisor rating) and a set of control variables. He 
concludes that relative wages inside the firm adjust to relative productivity, though 
by no means completely (as the elasticity is always below one). Larger firms adjust 
less their relative wages to productivity differences, which is interpreted as a result 
of higher monitoring costs, whereas firms in large markets adjust more, to avoid 
loosing its more productive workers.  
O'Reilly et al (1988) also relied on a narrow set of workers in approximately 
100 US firms, using the wages of CEOs to explicitly test social comparison theories 
against tournament theory. They found that comparisons with a reference group 
outside the firm would lead, in this case, to increased inequality within the firm. In 
fact, they interpret the increasing wage differentials at the top of the hierarchy as 
evidence in favour of a social comparison model, after finding that the wages of 
CEOs were positively linked to the wages of outside directors in the board or the 
compensation committee. Members of the compensation committee would thus set 
wages having in mind social comparisons, with their own wages as a benchmark. 
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4. Does wage compression lead to higher productivity and improved firm 
performance?  
Evidence on the impact of wage compression inside the firm on worker and firm 
performance is rather mixed, with results ranging from a positive impact to a 
negative one, and including a hump-shaped relationship or no significant 
relationship altogether.  
Several studies on particular occupations and industries concluded that wage 
dispersion inside the firm leads to lower performance.  
DeBrock et al (2004) used longitudinal linked employer-employee data to 
study the impact of wage dispersion on firm-level outcomes in a single industry —
baseball teams. Though a particular sector, it enables a clearer observation of worker 
productivity and firm performance than most other sectors. Several measures of firm 
performance are considered, from won-lost records and attendance of games, to the 
value of the franchise, revenue and profits, but the two first ones are analysed, given 
the more reliable information available. The authors compute the expected or market 
wage for a particular worker, by regressing the salary on several worker attributes, 
from his age to statistics of his performance in the previous year and throughout his 
career. They then compute two measures of wage dispersion inside the firm using 
the Herfindahl index: the dispersion of expected wages, to capture the degree of 
heterogeneity in workers’ observable quality; the dispersion in actual wages beyond 
the expected wage (residual wages), as an indicator of “unexplained” wage 
heterogeneity inside the firm. They find that wage dispersion has a negative impact 
on firm performance —teams with more homogenous worker observable quality 
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fare better and teams with less “unexplained” inequality also fare better9. Even 
though fairness considerations could play a role explaining the results, they interpret 
their evidence as more compellingly pointing to the relevance of matching workers 
with similar quality, given that the “technology” in this industry dictates a high 
degree of interdependence among workers’ skills. The matching of workers with 
similar quality would yield better outcomes, in a reasoning similar to that proposed 
by Kremer (1993). 
Similarly, Bloom (1999) analysed the performance of baseball teams using 
longitudinal data both on players and teams. The dispersion measures are computed 
on raw wages and he considers different indicators of the team sportive and financial 
performance, as well as individual player performance. Results indicate that, after 
controlling for team effects and a wide set of worker attributes, higher dispersion of 
salaries within the team has a negative impact on team performance and on most 
measures of individual performance. Interdependencies among workers’ skill are 
again pointed out as the crucial factor leading to this outcome. 
Another particular sector, that of academics, was analysed by Pfeffer and 
Langton (1993), relying on cross-section data on a wide sample of college and 
universities in the US. Despite the main focus on satisfaction, their work also deals 
with the impact of raw salary dispersion within a department on research 
productivity, measured as the number of publications authored10. They find that 
individual research productivity declines with salary dispersion within a given 
academic department. 
                       
9 Though this last result is not always significant. 
10 Normalized by dividing by the average in the scientific field. 
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The quality of the product, as perceived by the customers, has been used by 
Cowherd and Levine (1992) as an indicator of performance for approximately 100 
firms, mostly from the UK and US. They check the impact of inequality between the 
salary of top managers and lower level workers (hourly paid employees, as well as 
lower rank managers) on performance. The inequality measure basically compares 
the firm’s wage distribution to the outside market wage distribution: first, the 
relative position that top managers in the firm occupy in the wage distribution of top 
managers in the same region or industry is computed; similarly for lower level 
workers, their pay ranking in the outside market is computed; subsequently, the ratio 
of the two provides an indication of the degree of inequity internal to the firm, when 
compared to the surrounding economy. After controlling for factors that may 
influence the pay of lower level workers or pay equity inside the firm, such as 
worker unionization, firm size and its market share, or the complexity of the 
production technology, the authors find that higher wage dispersion inside the firm 
leads to lower performance. The results are interpreted as evidence showing that pay 
equity boosts motivation and induces worker commitment to the firm’s goals.  
 Studies relying on broader sets of occupations and industries, though 
controlling to different extents for these variables in their analyses, tend to find the 
opposite result, with a positive impact of wage dispersion on firm performance. 
Swedish white-collar workers were the target of analysis of Heyman (2005), 
using longitudinal linked employer-employee data. Both the raw wage dispersion 
within the firm and unexplained wage dispersion are considered, the second one 
computed on the residuals of a wage regression run separately for each firm and year 
with the worker observable attributes (gender, education, experience, tenure) as 
explanatory variables. Similarly to DeBrock et al (2004), this measure captures 
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wage dispersion persisting after taking into account observable dimensions of the 
human capital of the workers. In a second stage regression, the firm performance is 
regressed on the first stage alternative measures of wage dispersion and control 
variables (such as composition of the workforce, industry, and firm size). Some 
versions of the analysis account for firm unobserved heterogeneity to address the 
problem of omitted variables (that may be correlated with wage dispersion) and 
instrument wage dispersion using its lagged values from four years earlier, to 
address the potential endogeneity problem. The author finds that wage dispersion 
among white-collars in the firm has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Belfield and Marsden (2003) study performance-related pay and aim at 
judging on its relative merits, given that two opposite mechanisms may operate: an 
incentive mechanism, if it stimulates worker productivity; a disincentive 
mechanism, if equity is a matter of concern for workers. They use cross cross-
section linked employer-employee data on the UK to check the impact of 
performance-related pay on both intra-firm wage inequality and on firm 
performance.11 The financial performance of the firm is a self-reported measure, 
with establishment leaders asked to classify the establishment performance with 
respect to that of the other establishments in the same industry, from “much better” 
to “much worse” than average. The authors find that performance-related payment 
schemes are associated with both higher intra-firm inequality and better firm 
performance. They therefore conclude that any potential disincentive effects of 
performance-related pay are compensated by the incentive effects, resulting in a 
                       
11 Note that workers can be rewarded according to their performance and still the 
distribution of wages can exhibit lower dispersion than the distribution of 
productivities, if the premium on productivity increases less than proportionally. 
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positive overall impact on firm performance. That is particularly true for firms who 
adopt the “right” kind of payment system (performance-related or input-related), as 
predicted by a wide set of variables characterizing their production regime, nature of 
jobs, degree of supervision, etc. 
Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2004) also used cross-sectional linked 
employer-employee data, but on the Belgium economy. They run separate wage 
regressions for each firm and year and use the standard-error of each regression as 
the measure of wage dispersion inside the firm for similar workers. This is the 
explanatory variable of interest in a second-stage regression explaining firm 
performance (value-added per employee). Since wage dispersion may be 
endogenous, to the extent that good firm performance may lead to the award of 
wage premia to some workers, they instrument the dispersion of total salary with the 
dispersion of income taxes on salary excluding bonuses. Results indicate a positive 
impact of wage inequality inside the firm on firm productivity.12 
Hibbs and Locking (2000) identify “good” and “bad” wage compression. 
Their reasoning departs from the changes that took place after mid 80s in the 
Swedish economy, as its wage setting system moved away from centralized 
collective bargaining with strong equity concerns and both the economy’s wage 
distribution and firms’ wage distributions grew more unequal. The authors estimate 
Cobb-Douglas production functions and labour productivity functions, either one 
augmented with the inclusion of two terms on wage dispersion: dispersion within- 
                       
12 A positive impact of salary dispersion on firm performance tends to be found in 
other studies that concentrate only on the salary of managers and aim at testing 
tournament theories (see for instance Eriksson (1999) and Main et al, (1993)). 
Leonard’s (1990) work points to no significant relationship. 
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and between-firms. Using OLS to estimate the production functions and 
instrumental variables to estimate the productivity functions13, they reach two 
contrasting results: wage compression within the firm has an adverse effect on 
productive efficiency, reducing worker productivity and firm output, due to its 
(des)incentive effects, whereas wage compression across firms has a favourable 
impact on productive efficiency, as it provides an incentive for capital and labour to 
flow from less to more efficient firms. Though actually running their analysis at a 
rather aggregate level, these authors rely on variables computed from micro data on 
workers and firms. 
 An additional flavour to the results is brought by studies finding a hump-
shaped relationship between firm wage dispersion and its performance. 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999) use Austrian longitudinal linked 
employer-employee data and, lacking information on worker or firm performance, 
infer worker productivity from their wages. From a wage regression run separately 
for each firm and year, they retrieve: the estimated wage for a representative worker, 
which is taken as the indicator of firm productivity; the standard-error of the 
regression, taken as the measure of wage dispersion inside the firm for similar 
workers14. Subsequently, they run regressions of the proxy for productivity on a 
                       
13  Output is an endogenous variable in the productivity regression, being 
instrumented with its own lagged values and the Swedish exports to OECD 
countries. 
14 They estimate tobit regressions, given the top-coding of wages, and include as 
independent variables age, gender, tenure, blue-collar, and foreigner status, but not 
education, which is not available. 
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quadratic term on wage dispersion and control variables15, finding a hump-shaped 
pattern in the relationship —some inequality inside the firm would improve 
productivity, but too much inequality would be detrimental. Nevertheless, assuming 
that firms pay their workers their marginal product (to justify the use of wages as a 
proxy for productivity) excludes the possibility that wages can be determined by 
equity or similar types of considerations. Under this setting, it is not clear why wage 
dispersion would have an impact on productivity and the capacity of the procedure 
to ascertain the relationship under testing is limited.  
Linked employer-employee data on the Danish economy has been used by 
Bingley and Eriksson (2001), who similarly find, for white-collar workers, a hump-
shaped relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity —some 
inequality inside the firm improves performance, but too much inequality is counter-
productive. They depart from a different methodology, though: firm performance is 
measured as total factor productivity (the Solow residual in a Cobb-Douglas 
production function)16; wage dispersion is computed as the standard deviation of 
residual wages (after controlling for worker observables); the equation of interest, 
estimated in the second stage, relates firm performance to wage dispersion. Also 
here instrumental variables are used, since good firm performance may be associated 
with the payment of wage premia to some types of workers (such as managers), thus 
increasing wage dispersion inside the firm. The study takes advantage of the 
                       
15  Using OLS regressions on the contemporaneous levels of the dependent and 
independent variables and models with firm-specific effects, in a reasoning aimed at 
capturing longer-term relationships. 
16 They also proxy worker effort by the inverse of sickness absence (averaged for the 
firm level). 
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variation in the tax rates according to the worker municipality of residence, which 
impacts the dispersion of after-tax wages inside the firm but is assumed to have no 
direct impact on firm performance.  
Finally, still another group of studies finds no significant relationship. 
 Arguing that wage increases, rather than wage levels, are judged by workers 
in terms of fairness and have a more direct impact on morale, Grund and 
Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) analyse Danish data on both wage levels and wage 
changes, limiting their analysis to workers who remain with the same firm for at 
least two periods. Their indicator of firm performance is value added per employee 
and wage dispersion is measured as the lagged coefficient of variation of wages. 
Relying initially on OLS regressions with several controls for the composition of the 
workforce, they find a hump-shaped relationship between the dispersion of wages 
inside the firm and its performance, consistent with the results by Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimuller (1999). However that impact vanishes once unobservable differences 
across firms are accounted for by including firm fixed-effects in the regression.17  
It is curious that studies considering a very narrow set of occupations tend to 
find a negative impact of inequality on performance, whereas studies relying on 
broader occupation groups tend to find a positive impact of inequality on 
performance. Under a setting of interdependent preferences, could it be that workers 
indeed adopt narrow comparison groups such as the specific occupation? Under a 
setting of interdependence of skills, could it be that studies using a broader set of 
                       
17 When considering the dispersion of wage increases, instead, they find that for the 
bulk of firms and for white-collars in particular, fairness considerations dominate, 
with an increase in the dispersion of wage changes being associated with worse firm 
performance. 
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occupations are picking up positive externalities that may result from combining 
workers of different occupations within the firm? 
Pfeffer and Langton’s comment remains pertinent: “One of the more useful 
avenues for research on pay systems may be precisely this task of determining not 
which pay scheme is best but, rather, under what conditions salary dispersion has 
positive effects and under what conditions it has negative effects.” (Pfeffer and 
Langton, 1993: 383) 
 
5. Does wage compression reduce worker turnover?  
Evidence on the implications of firm wage compression on worker and job flows is 
rather scarce, but already divergent. In general, on theoretical grounds, morale and 
equity type of models would suggest that firms with higher inequality would have 
higher worker flows, whereas labour market frictions and monopsony type of 
models would lead to lower flows, also because employers would have more 
freedom to manipulate wages trying to retain certain workers. 
The Slovenian economy is analysed by Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) 
using longitudinal matched employer-employee data. They rely on several indicators 
of wage dispersion within the firm: i) raw wage dispersion; ii) residual wage 
dispersion, after controlling for worker observable attributes (education, experience 
and tenure); iii) similar residual wage dispersion, but further controlling for firm 
fixed effects; and finally iv) difference in wage dispersion between a model with 
firm and worker observable attributes plus their interaction, and a model with just 
worker observables. The aim is to pin down the dispersion resulting from 
idiosyncratic worker wage effects within the firm, given that: specification (ii) 
controls for the influence of collective bargaining that sets base wages relying on 
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worker observable attributes; specification (iii) further controls for firm-wide wage 
policies that affect every worker in the firm in the same way; specification (iv) 
retrieves wage dispersion within similar firms and within groups of workers with 
similar observable attributes, beyond the inequality existing in the overall economy 
within this group of workers. Subsequently, alternative measures of job and worker 
flows are regressed on these alternative indicators of wage dispersion (plus controls 
for the firm average residual wage and the industry). Results show that higher wage 
dispersion inside the firm18 leads to less employment volatility, i.e. less job creation 
and destruction, which the authors interpret as an indication that, in the presence of 
more flexible wages, when shocks occur quantities do not need to adjust as much. 
However, results are less clear-cut once the analysis focuses on worker reallocation, 
since two opposing forces play a role. Note that excess worker reallocation, the 
major indicator commented upon, evaluates the flow of workers over and above 
what is strictly needed to account for the employment change in the firm, reflecting 
worker separations that are not due to job destruction and worker accessions that are 
not due to the need to fill a newly created job. Excess reallocation therefore 
quantifies matches worker-firm that are destroyed and replaced by another match, 
with no change in the overall employment level. Interestingly, the authors find that 
in firms with higher wage dispersion, excess worker separations come 
predominantly from worse matches (workers from the lower part of the residual 
wage distribution), and less so from better matches (workers from the higher part of 
the residual wage distribution). In other words, firms with high wage dispersion are 
able to retain their best workers, while inducing the worst ones to leave. As such, 
                       
18 Lagged one period. 
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wage dispersion would work as a device used by firms to promote better job 
matches. 
A comparable result is reached by Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992), though 
concentrating on a narrow occupational group, that of college and university 
administrators in the US. They find that a higher dispersion of the salary distribution 
is negatively associated with turnover for administrators with high salaries and 
positively associated with turnover for those with low salaries. Public knowledge of 
the salary distribution, either within the firm or in the external labour market, 
contributes to strengthen this relationship. In their analysis, the authors control for 
several other factors, both at the firm and the individual level, that may have an 
impact on turnover, such as the firm’s size and financial resources, the type of 
institution and its funding source, the tenure structure of its workforce and the 
worker’s gender and tenure. 
A method to compute wage dispersion within the firm similar to Haltiwanger 
and Vodopivec (2003) had been used by Powell, Montgomery and Cosgrove (1994), 
as they relied on the residual wages retrieved from a regression of wages on worker 
observable attributes (in particular, education and experience) and establishment 
fixed-effects. Unlike Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, though, they concentrate on one 
single industry —child care centers in the US. They estimate tobit models on quit 
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and fire rates at the establishment level19, finding that wage dispersion within the 
firm has no significant impact on worker turnover.20 
Mixed results are also reported by Heyman (2008), who uses Swedish 
longitudinal linked employer-employee data but nevertheless runs his analysis on 
industry level aggregates. Wage dispersion is computed as the coefficient of 
variation of raw wages within the industry. Alternative indicators of job flows —job 
reallocation and its separate components, job creation and job creation— are 
regressed on the wage dispersion measure. Industry unobservable heterogeneity is 
accounted for and the potential endogeneity of wage dispersion is handled by using 
its lagged values as instruments. Results show that in manufacturing, sub-industries 
with higher wage dispersion have lower job reallocation, in particular job 
destruction.21 Again this author interprets the finding as suggesting that wage 
compression limits the extent of wage adjustments and therefore calls for 
employment adjustments once shocks hit an industry. However, in the services, the 
opposite effect is detected, as sub-industries with higher wage dispersion have 
                       
19 Instrumenting the wage level of the establishment, which is also included in the 
regression, with indicators of the cost of living and the wages in the area, as well as 
the fees charged by the school. 
20 The analysis by Galizzi (2001) of the duration of employment spells, aimed at 
detecting contrasts in the behaviour of men and women, included among the 
explanatory variables the interaction of the worker’s own wage with the average 
wage in the firm for the worker’s broad occupation and gender. This measure of 
“relative wages” matches more closely an indicator of the firm wage level, rather 
than a measure of wage dispersion inside the firm. 
21 With no significant effect detected on job creation. 
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higher job reallocation22. Differences in the technology used and the possibly higher 
costs of job reallocation in the manufacturing sector may play a role explaining this 
difference in patterns between manufacturing and the services, but the exact 
mechanism in operation does not seem to have yet been pinpointed. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Having in late-80s asked the question "Does the new generation of labor economists 
know more than the older generation?", Freeman asserted "the main conclusion I 
reach is that while labor economists are more knowledgeable of labor supply issues, 
we do not know more about firm behavior, labor demand and the overall functioning 
of the markets" (Freeman, 1989: 319). The empirical discussion on the existence of 
a firm wage compression effect and some of its implications is an example of the 
use of linked employer-employee data by the research community during the last 
couple of decades to gear research in the direction suggested by Freeman.  
However, alongside with the potential of LEED, the difficulties involved in 
testing for the existence of a firm wage compression effect and its implications have 
been exposed. In fact, the margin of consensual results seems rather small: there is 
some degree of uniformity in wages within a firm, more so the narrower the set of 
occupations considered.  
Once the aim is to explore the reasons and implications of an employer wage 
compression effect, we find all shades of results. Several reasons can justify this 
outcome: the data sets used have quite different characteristics, from coverage of a 
narrow set of occupations in a narrow set of firms, to coverage of the population of 
                       
22 With no significant impact on job creation and job destruction separately. 
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firms and workers in an economy; the measures used, in particular on worker and 
firm performance, have also diverged widely; the empirical methods so far used are 
equally far apart in their capacity to tackle the issue and address the potential 
empirical problems. This strand of literature is probably still in its infancy (or 
teenagehood).  
Identification of a test that would enable disentangling theories that often 
lead to similar predictions on this issue remains a challenge. One of the aims of this 
chapter has been to show some of the way that the empirical literature has covered 
and to highlight some of the major theories that could guide future empirical 
research on this topic. 
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